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Abstract
This paper studies a class of incentive schemes based on intervention, where there exists an
intervention device that is able to monitor the actions of users and to take an action that affects
the payoffs of users. We consider the case of perfect monitoring, where the intervention device
can immediately observe the actions of users without errors. We also assume that there exist
actions of the intervention device that are most and least preferred by all the users and the
intervention device, regardless of the actions of users. We derive analytical results about the
outcomes achievable with intervention, and illustrate our results with an example based on the
Cournot model.
1 Introduction
This paper studies incentive schemes to drive self-interested users toward the system objective.
The operation of networks by non-cooperative, self-interested users in general leads to a suboptimal
performance [1]. As a result, different forms of incentive schemes to improve the performance have
been investigated in the literature. One form of incentive schemes widely studied in economics and
engineering is pricing (or more generally, transfer of utilities) [2]. Pricing can induce efficient use
of network resources by aligning private incentives with social objectives. Although pricing has a
solid theoretical foundation, implementing a pricing scheme can be impractical or cumbersome in
some cases. Let us consider a wireless Internet service as an example. A service provider can limit
access to its network resources by charging an access fee. However, charging an access fee requires
a secure and reliable method to process payments, which creates burden on both sides of users and
service providers. There also arises the issue of allocative fairness when a service provider charges
for the Internet service. In the presence of the income effect, uniform pricing will bias the allocation
of network resources towards users with high incomes. Because the Internet can play the role of
an information equalizer, it has been argued in a public policy debate that access to the Internet
should be provided as a public good by a public authority rather than as a private good in a market
[3].
Another method to provide incentives is to use repeated interaction [4]. Repeated interaction
can encourage cooperative behavior by adjusting future payoffs depending on current behavior. A
repeated game strategy can form a basis of an incentive scheme in which monitoring and punishment
burden is decentralized to users (see, for example, [5]). However, implementing a repeated game
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strategy requires repeated interaction among users, which may not be available. For example, users
interacting in a mobile network change frequently in nature.
In this paper, we study an alternative form of incentive schemes based on intervention, which
was proposed in our previous work [6]. In an incentive scheme based on intervention, a network
is augmented with an intervention device that is able to monitor the actions of users and to take
an action that affects the payoffs of users. Intervention directly affects the network usage of users,
unlike pricing which uses an outside instrument to affect the payoffs of users. Thus, an incentive
scheme based on intervention can provide an effective and robust method to provide incentives
in that users cannot avoid intervention as long as they use network resources. Moreover, it does
not require long-term relationship among users, which makes it applicable to networks with a
dynamically changing user population.
As a first step toward the study of incentive schemes based on intervention, we focus in this paper
on the case of perfect monitoring, where the intervention device can immediately observe the actions
chosen by users without errors. We derive analytical results assuming that there exist actions of the
intervention device that are most and least preferred by all the users and the intervention device,
regardless of the actions of users. We then illustrate our results with an example based on the
Cournot model.
2 Model
We consider a network where N users and an intervention device interact. The set of the users
is denoted by N = {1, . . . , N}. The action space of user i is denoted by Ai, and the action
of user i is denoted by ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . An action profile is represented by a vector
a = (a1, . . . , aN ) ∈ A ,
∏
i∈N Ai. An action profile of the users other than user i is written as
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , aN ) so that a can be expressed as a = (ai,a−i). The intervention
device observes the actions chosen by the users immediately, and then it chooses its own action.
The action space of the intervention device is denoted by A0, and its action is denoted by a0 ∈ A0.
For convenience, we sometimes call the intervention device user 0. The set of the users and the
intervention device is denoted by N0 = N ∪ {0}.
The actions of the intervention device and the users jointly determine their payoffs. The payoff
function of user i ∈ N0 is denoted by ui : A0 × A → R. That is, ui(a0,a) represents the payoff
that user i receives when the intervention device chooses action a0 and the users choose an action
profile a. In particular, the payoff of the intervention device, u0(a0,a), can be interpreted as the
system objective. Since the intervention device can choose its action knowing the actions chosen
by the users, a strategy for it can be represented by a function f : A → A0, which is called an
intervention rule. The set of all possible intervention rules is denoted by F .
Suppose that there is a network manager who determines the intervention rule used by the
intervention device. We assume that the manager can commit to an intervention rule, for example,
by using a protocol embedded in the intervention device. The game played by the manager and
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the users is called an intervention game. The sequence of events in an intervention game can be
listed as follows.
1. The manager chooses an intervention rule f ∈ F .
2. The users choose their actions a ∈ A, knowing the intervention rule f chosen by the manager.
3. The intervention device observes the action profile a ∈ A and takes an action a0 = f(a) ∈ A0.
The payoff function of user i ∈ N0 provided that the manager has chosen an intervention rule
f is given by vfi : A→ R, where
vfi (a) = ui(f(a),a). (1)
An intervention rule f induces a simultaneous game played by the users, whose normal form
representation is given by
Γf =
〈
N, (Ai)i∈N , (v
f
i )i∈N
〉
. (2)
We can predict actions chosen by the users given an intervention rule f by applying the solution
concept of Nash equilibrium to the induced game Γf .
Definition 1. An intervention rule f ∈ F sustains an action profile a∗ ∈ A if a∗ is a Nash
equilibrium of the game Γf , i.e.,
vfi (a
∗) ≥ vfi (ai,a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . (3)
An action profile a∗ is sustainable if there exists an intervention rule f that sustains a∗.
Let E(f) ⊆ A be the set of action profiles sustained by f . Then the set of all sustainable action
profiles is given by E = ∪f∈FE(f). A pair of an intervention rule f and an action profile a is said to
be attainable if f sustains a. The manager’s problem is to find an attainable pair that maximizes
the payoff of the intervention device among all attainable pairs.
Definition 2. (f∗,a∗) ∈ F ×A is an intervention equilibrium if a∗ ∈ E(f∗) and
vf
∗
0 (a
∗) ≥ vf0 (a) (4)
for all (f,a) ∈ F ×A such that a ∈ E(f). f∗ ∈ F is an optimal intervention rule if there exists an
action profile a∗ ∈ A such that (f∗,a∗) is an intervention equilibrium.
Intervention equilibrium is a solution concept for intervention games, based on a backward in-
duction argument. An intervention equilibrium can be considered as a subgame perfect equilibrium
applied to an intervention game, since the induced game Γf is a subgame of an intervention game.
It is implicitly assumed that the manager can induce the users to choose the best Nash equilibrium
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for the system in case of multiple Nash equilibria. One possible explanation for this is that the
manager recommends to the users an action profile sustained by the intervention rule he chooses
so that the action profile becomes a focal point [7]. The manager’s problem of finding an optimal
intervention rule can be expressed as
max
f∈F
max
a∈E(f)
vf0 (a). (5)
3 Analytical Results
In this section, we derive analytical results about sustainable action profiles and intervention equi-
libria imposing the following assumption.
Assumption 1. There exist a0, a0 ∈ A0 such that for all i ∈ N0,
ui(a0,a) ≥ ui(a0,a) ≥ ui(a0,a) for all a0 ∈ A0, for all a ∈ A. (6)
a0 and a0 can be interpreted as the minimal and maximal intervention actions of the intervention
device, respectively. For given a ∈ A, the users and the intervention device receive the highest (resp.
lowest) payoff when the intervention device takes the minimal (resp. maximal) intervention action.
This allows the intervention device to reward or punish all the users at the same time.
We first characterize the set of sustainable action profiles, E . The following class of intervention
rules is useful to characterize E .
Definition 3. fa˜ : A→ A0 is an extreme intervention rule with target action profile a˜ ∈ A if
fa˜(a) =
{
a0 if a = a˜,
a0 otherwise.
(7)
Note that an extreme intervention rule uses only the two extreme points of A0. With an extreme
intervention rule, the intervention device chooses the most preferred action for the users when they
follow the target action profile while choosing the least preferred action when they deviate. Hence,
an extreme intervention rule provides the strongest incentive for sustaining a given target action
profile, which leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If a∗ ∈ E, then a∗ ∈ E(fa∗).
Proof. Suppose that a∗ ∈ E . Then there exists an intervention rule f such that ui(f(a∗),a∗) ≥
ui(f(ai,a
∗
−i), ai,a
∗
−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . Then we obtain ui(a0,a∗) ≥ ui(f(a∗),a∗) ≥
ui(f(ai,a
∗
−i), ai,a
∗
−i) ≥ ui(a0, ai,a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N , where the first and the third
inequalities follow from (6).
Let F e be the set of all extreme intervention rules, i.e., F e = {fa˜ ∈ F : a˜ ∈ A}. Also, define
Ee = ∪f∈F eE(f) = {a ∈ A : ∃f ∈ F e such that f sustains a}. By applying Lemma 1, we can
obtain the following results.
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Theorem 1. (i) a∗ ∈ E if and only if ui(a0,a∗) ≥ ui(a0, ai,a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N .
(ii) E = Ee.
(iii) If (f∗,a∗) is an intervention equilibrium, then (fa∗ ,a
∗) is also an intervention equilibrium.
Proof. (i) Suppose that ui(a0,a
∗) ≥ ui(a0, ai,a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai, for all i ∈ N . Then fa∗ sustains
a∗, and thus a∗ ∈ E . The converse follows from Lemma 1.
(ii) E ⊃ Ee follows from F ⊃ F e, while E ⊂ Ee follows from Lemma 1.
(iii) Suppose that (f∗,a∗) is an intervention equilibrium. Then by Definition 2, f∗ sustains a∗,
and vf
∗
0 (a
∗) ≥ vf0 (a) for all (f,a) ∈ F ×A such that a ∈ E(f). Since a∗ ∈ E , a∗ ∈ E(fa∗) by Lemma
1. Hence, vf
∗
0 (a
∗) ≥ u0(fa∗(a∗),a∗). On the other hand, since fa∗(a∗) = a0, we have vf
∗
0 (a
∗) ≤
u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗) by (6). Therefore, vf
∗
0 (a
∗) = u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗), and thus u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗) ≥ vf0 (a) for
all (f,a) ∈ F ×A such that a ∈ E(f). This proves that (fa∗,a∗) is an intervention equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that there is no loss of generality in three senses when we restrict attention
to extreme intervention rules. First, in order to test whether there exists an intervention rule that
sustains a given action profile, it suffices to consider only the extreme intervention rule having the
action profile as its target action profile. Second, the set of action profiles that can be sustained by
an intervention rule remains the same when we consider only extreme intervention rules. Third, if
there exists an optimal intervention rule, we can find an optimal intervention rule among extreme
intervention rules.
Note that the role of extreme intervention rules is analogous to that of trigger strategies in
repeated games with perfect monitoring. To generate the set of equilibrium payoffs, it suffices to
consider trigger strategies that trigger the most severe punishment in case of a deviation. Under
Assumption 1, the maximal intervention action a0 plays a similar role to mutual minmaxing [4] in
that it provides the strongest threat to deter a deviation. The next theorem provides a necessary
and sufficient condition under which an extreme intervention rule together with its target action
profile constitutes an intervention equilibrium.
Theorem 2. (fa∗,a
∗) is an intervention equilibrium if and only if a∗ ∈ E and u0(a0,a∗) ≥ u0(a0,a)
for all a ∈ E.
Proof. Suppose that (fa∗ ,a
∗) is an intervention equilibrium. Then fa∗ sustains a
∗, and thus a∗ ∈ E .
Also, u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗) ≥ vf0 (a) for all (f,a) ∈ F × A such that a ∈ E(f). Choose any a ∈ E . Then
by Lemma 1, fa sustains a, and thus u0(a0,a
∗) = u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗) ≥ u0(fa(a),a) = u0(a0,a).
Suppose that a∗ ∈ E and u0(a0,a∗) ≥ u0(a0,a) for all a ∈ E . To prove that (fa∗ ,a∗) is an
intervention equilibrium, we need to show (i) fa∗ sustains a
∗, and (ii) u0(fa∗(a
∗),a∗) ≥ vf0 (a) for
all (f,a) ∈ F ×A such that a ∈ E(f). Since a∗ ∈ E , (i) follows from Lemma 1. To prove (ii), choose
any (f,a) ∈ F × A such that a ∈ E(f). Then u0(fa∗(a∗),a∗) = u0(a0,a∗) ≥ u0(a0,a) ≥ vf0 (a),
where the first inequality follows from a ∈ E .
Theorem 2 implies that if we obtain an action profile a∗ such that a∗ ∈ argmaxa∈E u0(a0,a),
we can use it to construct an intervention equilibrium and thus an optimal intervention rule.
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Figure 1: Contour lines of social welfare in the Cournot duopoly game.
4 Illustrative Example
In this section, we discuss an example to illustrate the results in Section 3. Consider a wireless
network with two users and an intervention device interfering with each other. The action of user
i is its usage level, where Ai = [0, ai] for i = 0, 1, 2. ai is the maximum usage level of user i. The
total usage level is given by a0 + a1 + a2. The quality of service is determined by the total usage
level, following the relationship
Q(a0, a1, a2) = [q − b(a0 + a1 + a2)]+, (8)
where q, b > 0 and [x]+ = max{x, 0}. The payoff of user i ∈ {1, 2} is given by the product of the
quality received and its usage level,
ui(a0, a1, a2) = Q(a0, a1, a2)ai. (9)
The system objective is given by social welfare, which is defined as the sum of the payoffs of the
users,
u0(a0, a1, a2) = u1(a0, a1, a2) + u2(a0, a1, a2). (10)
Note that if there is no intervention device (i.e., if a0 is held fixed at 0), the example is identical to the
Cournot duopoly model with a linear demand function and zero production cost. The corresponding
Cournot duopoly game achieves the symmetric social optimum at a1 = a2 = aL := q/4b while it
has the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium at a1 = a2 = aH := q/3b, as depicted in Figure 1. Hence,
the goal of the manager is to improve upon the inefficient outcome (aH , aH) by introducing the
intervention device in the network.
Given the structure of the intervention game in this example, the capability of the interven-
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tion device is determined by its maximum intervention level a0. In the following, we investigate
sustainable action profiles and those that constitute an intervention equilibrium as we vary a0.
Proposition 1. (i) If a0 = 0, then E = {(aH , aH)}.
(ii) If a0 ≥ q/b, then E = A.
(iii) If a0 ≥ (3
√
2− 4)q/4√2b, then {(aL, aL)} ∈ E and thus {(aL, aL)} constitutes an intervention
equilibrium.
If the intervention device cannot affect the payoffs of the users (a0 = 0), the non-cooperative
outcome (aH , aH) is the only sustainable action profile that is consistent with the self-interest of
the users. On the other hand, if the intervention device can apply a sufficiently high intervention
level (a0 ≥ q/b), it has the ability to degrade the quality to zero no matter what action profile
the users choose. Since the payoffs of the users are non-negative, the punishment from using a0 is
strong enough to make every action profile sustainable. We can also find a condition on a0 that
enables f(aL,aL) to sustain the symmetric social optimum (aL, aL). With a0 ≥ (3
√
2 − 4)q/4√2b,
(aL, aL) is sustainable and thus (f(aL,aL), (aL, aL)) is an intervention equilibrium by Theorem 2.
Figure 2 plots the set E for six different values of a0 with parameters q = 12, b = 1, and a1 =
a2 = 12. We can see that E expands as a0 increases, starting from a single point (aH , aH) = (4, 4)
when a0 = 0 to the entire space A when a0 ≥ q/b = 12. When a0 < (3
√
2− 4)q/4√2b ≈ 0.51, only
the action profile that is closest to (aL, aL) = (3, 3) among those in E constitutes an intervention
equilibrium. When a0 ≥ (3
√
2− 4)q/4√2b ≈ 0.51, the action profiles in E that satisfies a1 + a2 =
2aL = 6 constitute an intervention equilibrium, as all of them yield the maximum social welfare.
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